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EXPORTS AND GROWTH:_ THE CASE OF SRI LANKA
I.

INTRODUCTION

With the exception of a few nations in North America,
Western Europe, and Japan~ most nations of the world are
classified as economically less developed~

These less

developed countries (LDCs) may be characterized relative to
the developed countries (DCs) by a number of- common features,
the most important being a low average real per capita income.
The patterns of foreign trade are among the most important of
the external forces affecting the constraints on development.
An LDC can pursue an inward looking development strategy,
concentrating on replacing imports with domestic production,
or an outward looking development strategy, concentrating on
promoting and expanding exports.

It is with the latter

approach to development that I am concerned.
A prominent theme in economics since the time of Adam
Smith has been the belief that foreign trade has a positive
effect on a countiy's development.

For several reasons

developed in the literature the gains from trade are viewed to
1
be continually merging with the gains from developme~t.
Theory tells us that countries with above-average export
growth should tend to have above-average output growth.

A

stronger statement is that countries that have at least
neutral if not pro-export trade regimes tend to grow faster
than countries with trade
substitution.

regimes

that favor

import

This is partly because exports and thus import
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capacity grow faster, but also for other reasons related to
efficiency and technological change.
Empirically there is substantial evidence in the form of
both cross-section studies and time-series studies showing
significant positive correlation between the growth of exports
and the growth of national income.
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.

Frequently the conclusion

is drawn that the promotion of exports, any and all, is going
to be beneficial.

In an age of tapering

development

assistance, and more restrictive international agency lending,
this may seem particularly attractive to countries that have
undertaken an ambitious development plan and are faced with a
growing need for foreign exchange to finance it.
Despite this support, however, there has been criticism
of the theory.

3

While there is widespread agreement that a

country benefits most from free trade, the emphasis should be
on free rather than on trade.

There is nothing inherently

desirable about trade if that trade is not motivated by market
forces.

There is nothing in the theory of the gains from

trade to

justify the general use of policies of export

promotion (Bhagwati

[3,

1967]).

Export promotion can be

justified only to the extent that there exists some market
distortion or externality that drives a wedge between the
socially optimal level of exports and the private level of
exports, resulting in either a general underinvestment or a
sectional mismatching of financial resources devoted to
exports.

Thus the conclusion should be that promotion of

exports i s be n e f i c i a 1 to the extent that there exists some
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discrepancy in the aggregate b~tween the socially optimal
level of exports and the·private ,level of exports and that the
I

particular industries to be /promoted are indeed those
industries that are underinvested.
Many of

the

existing empirical studies deal with

relatively large numbers of LDCs as a group, as though they
were somehow homogeneous rather than unique cases.

And/or,

they concentrate on LDCs which a priori display all of the
implicit characteristics necessary to make the theoretical
argument hold.

4

The problem is that there are many individual

LDCs that do not display all of these characteristics.

And,

as such, the policy prescriptions of many of the ~xisting
studies may not be optimal for them.

The neglect of such

countries constitutes a s~rious gap in the literature on
exports and economic development.
In this work an attempt is made to begin to fill the gap
by undertaking a cas~ study of Sri Lanka, one of the world's
poorest countries which has had a very long history of being
export sector oiiented in its policies.

Th~ objectives of the

study are to demonstrate that exports have not been an engine
of growth in Sri Lanka and that this failure may be explained
in part by an

examination

of

the

industry/market

characteristics of Sri Lanka's traditional major exports.

The

objective thus is not to refute the theory that export growth
can lead t~ national income growth,

but to iniroduce the

caveat that it will not necessarily do so depending on the
nature of the exports.
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Sri Lanka (formerly known as Ceylon) is an island' nation of
about 66,000 square kilometers, located 29 kilometers off
India's southern coast in the Indian Ocean.

With a population

of approximately 15.2 millibn in 1982 i~ had a per capita
Gross National Product (GNP) of $320 U.S. and a growth rate of
GNP/capita of only 2.5% per annum over the period 1960-82.
The country was a British colony from 1796 until 1948 when it
became an independent republic within the British Commonwealth
of Nations.
Other than its farmlands Sri Lanka has few natural
resources.

The chief consumption crop has always been rice.

Historically self-sufficient in its production, within sixty
years of the British control over half of the rice had to be
imported, as more and more land was turned into plantations
By the_mid-1960's

for the production of export crops.

continuing food shortages forced the government to begin land
reforms and to refocus long-standing import-substitution
programs toward agriculture.
self-sufficiency in food stuffs

Despite this move toward
(which has largely been

successful) Sri Lanka's government has taken steps to improve
the world market competitive position of its plantations.
Government assistance to the plantation industry included
replanting schemes based on cash subsidies and fertilizer
subsidies to the producers.

In addition, the tea industry was
)

further assisted by a factory modernization plan begun in 1966
and by tax rebates.
Major export crops ar~ tea, rubber and coconut products.
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Tea is the largest crop in terms of volume of produce, value
of produce and land area cultivated.

During and after the

Korean War Sri Lank\ experienced a major tea boom that greatly
contributed to a domestic economic boom.

In the long run this

may have hurt Sri Lanka as it was short lived and when it
lasted tended to create a false sense of security.

Since the

end of the boom Sri Lanka has had to face stiff competition in
all three a~eas.

Sri Lanka has always lagged behind the rest

of the world in replanting its plantations.

The percentage of

gross capital formation devoted to land improvement has always
been small and it declined steadily throughout the decade of
the 1960 1 s.

Foreign competitors have made considerable

improvements in techniques of cultivation and have raised
productivity while

Sri

Lanka

lagged far behind.

At

approximately the same time the government also began a
stepped up program of industrialization aimed at the creation
and development of a "new export sector".

II.

5

EXPORTS AS AN ENGINE OF GROWTH?

The question is have exports propelled growth in Sri
Lanka?

To answer this question a series of tests were applied

to data from the 1957-1978 time period.

As stated, it is the

hypothesis of this study that exports had not done so.

Kravis

[22,1970] in attempting to develop a test to see if exports
were an engine of growth felt that certain characteristics
should be present if this was the case.

The two primary
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characteristics are a high export to Gross National Product
(GNP) ratio and that the growth of GNP in one period should be
a positive functi6n of the growth of exports in the preceeding
period, i.e., Areal GNPt = f(~real exports t-l).
Consider the real export to GNP ratio.

6

Although the

average value over the time period was quite high, 20%, the
ratio steadily declined over the time period considered (the
average annual rate of charge in the ratio·was -2.18%) to near

14%.

(see table I)
Not only did Sri Lanka seemingly not display the first

characteristic
characteristic.

neither

did

it

display

the

Once again using the data for

second

1957-1978

(first observation 1957-58, last observation 1977-78) the
regression equation was found to be
~GNPt = 373. 35 - 0. 57

(201.68)
with an r 2 =

~

Xt-l

(0.32)
significant.

Somewhat

perplexing is that the correlation is negative.

Certainly

.15 which

is

not

there exists no theory to predict this and indeed Kravi~'s
approach has been critized for having problems with .auto
· correlation due to the fact that exports are counted in GNP as
a positive input.
Due to these potential problems with auto correlation it
may be argued that it is preter~ble to look at the correlation
between (x - p) and (f - p), where x represents the per annum
growth rate of real exports, p represents the1 per annum growth
rate of population, and f represents the per annum growth- r~ie
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of real domestically produce<d internal final demand (Heller
and Porter. [15, 1978, p.192]).

Thus, in addition to the

above, the correlation between the annual growth rates of per·
capita real exports and real domestically produced internal
final demand was examined using the Spearman rank correlation
test.

Over the total time period c6nsidered (1957-78) the

coefficient of the Spearman rank correlation between (x-p) and
(f-p)

is -.336, which is not significant.

Surprising,

however, was that the observed correlation was once again
negative despite substantial theoretical arguments that it
"should be positive.
When various sub-periods of time were considered some
additional surprising results were found.

These sub-periods

were chosen in regard to significant changes in Sri~Lanka's
international trade policies.
[14,1977],

According to Gunasekera

the period up to 1965 was characterized by

increasing import substitution policies with little attention
paid to exports.

Although Peiris

[29,1977] does not~ there

were some significant changes in the plantation agriculture
during this time period.

On-the-other-hand, the period from

1965-78 was characterized by a relaxing and refocusing of
import substitution programs and in increasing emphasis on
export diversification.

Karunaratne [18,1979,pp.55-56] I notes

that there was a "Volte Face in Industrial Policy in 1965."
part of

t.h e

new d e v e 1 op me n t

s t r at egy

i n

A

re 1 at ion to

industrialization was an emphasis on industries with export
potential.

To promote exports several incentives were offered
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to investors including special treatment with regards to: (1)
a number of different

business

taxes,

(2)

imports of

intermediate and raw materials, and (3) foreign exchange.
These themes being given more definite emphasis in the
F'ive-Year Plan of 1972-76

(Balakrishnan,

[l,1977].

For

1957-64 the coefficient was +.29, which although insignificant
was of the predicted sign.

For 1965-78 the correlation was

negative, with a coefficient of -.47, which is significant at
the 10% level.

And, for 1973-78 the correlation was again

negative, with a coefficient of -.89, which is significant at
the 5% level.

Thus, it appears that not only can we conclude

that exports have not been an engine of gtowth in Sri Lanka,
but that perhaps over time they may actually have begun to
inhibited it.

III.

THE EXPORT SECTOR

Since exports were not found to be an engine of growth in
Sri Lanka,

it is both interesting and important to ask why.

The studies by Michaely

[26,1977],

and Heller and Porter

[15,1978] both suggest that there is a minimum threshold of
development needed before export growth and economic growth
are associated.

Indeed,

Balassa

[2,1978]

looks only at

countries which have already established an industrial base.
While this is a possibility, I believe that the reason for
this lack of correlation may well be found by examining the
export sector of Sri Lanka.
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Since tea,
constitute

rubber,

about

and coconut products

88%. of

annually

the value of all exports,

examinat~on of these products is a good place to start.

an
One

possible reason for the failure could be that the country has
failed to substitute products exported in response to changes
in demand.

Love [25,1982, p.52] found "that the demand factor

is the single most i~portant determinant of developing
countries' export performance ••• 11
of

Sri

Lanka's

possibility.

three major

Due to the unique nature
exp9rts this

is a strong

Tea, rubber, and coconuts all have long lead

times and are geographically sensitive.

Long lead times can

best be defined by example.

If the price of rubber goes up

one year,

a tree and expect to start

you cannot plant

harvesting it the next year.

Instead, you must wait a long

tim~ before you can increase the quantity of rubber available
for.export.
sensitivity.

Tea

is

a

classic example of geogra~hic

The location of the crop is determined puiely by

elevation and climate conditions to which the crop displays a
remarkable sensitivity.

However, once a rubber or coconut

tree, or a tea bush is planted it will live for decades with
little care.

Hence the yield of the three products is fairly

constant o~er lbng periods of time, with increases in output
the result of long range planning and new technology (improved
fertilize~,

irrigation, harvesting methods, and the like).

Undoubtedly, many of the tea bushes being harvested in the
1960's were planted in response to the tea boom of the early
1950's.

Since the domestic markets for these products are

-10-

small relative to output, once the products are harvested
there is little alternative but to sell at the going price for
exports.

7

Also, the response of GNP to export growth is

powerfully affected by what

is happening to the terms of

trade, which generally declined over the period.

It should be

noted that the cause of export based growth--gro~th of
exports--is also the cause of immiserizing growth in the
presen6e of highly inelastic export demand.

Furthermore,

Gunasekera [13,1974,p.86] notes that in the case of Sri Lanka
"although both demand and supply factors have led to the slow
growth in-plantation agriculture, the demand side seems to
have had the more deterrent effect."

A survey of data for tea

and rubber reveals in both cases the quantities produced and
exported are generally increasing overtime while the real
average f.o.b. unit values have been steadily decreasing.

One

implication is that because the plantations already exist and
the fixed costs are high relative to the variable costs the
exporters have responded to the world price turning against
them by increasing the quantity exported.

Since these crops

are Sri Lanka's principal sources of foreign exchangei the
increase in the quantities exported may be viewed as _efforts
to maintain the foreign exchange earnings of the country.

In

the short run, which may be very lpng for these products, as
long as the world price is at least equal to the increased
cost of variable inputs export quantities will increase.

We

suspect then that in terms of the traditional major exports
Sri Lanka will have to run 'very fast to stay in the same
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place.
There is considerable evidence that success in promoting
manufactured exports is critical to the course of industrial
development,

Chenery,

(8,

1980].

The successful exp_ort

performers, demonstrate that industrial transformation
involves a significant rise in manufacturing_'s share in GNP
and a shift away from dependence on primary exports as a
source of foreign exchange.

In light of the above it is

tempting to reach the preliminary conclusion that Sri Lanka
should encourage nontraditional exports with an eye towards
diversification.

We cannot, however, for as noted Sri Lanka

was doing just that over the second half of the time period
considered and with some success (the average% of total
export value accounted for by traditional exports was 91% for
1957-641 83% for 1965-78iand only 73% for 1973-78; and
manufacturing as a percentage of GNP grew from approximately
11% to_l5% over the period).

And,

it was precisely in this

later period of time that the correlation between export
growth and economic growth became negative and increased in
significance.

The question then is, did the export sector not

diversify quickly _ehough to compensate for the decline in
traditional export markets or did the government encourage the
promotion of the wrong exports?
To answer this question would require a very detailed
analysis of the new export sector which is still quite small
and for which little- useful data exists.
unanswered at this time.

As such it must go

In light of the problems Sri Lanka
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experienced under their import-substitution regime and the
disasterous state of their traditional export markets, it is
likely that both parts of the question contain some truth.
Warnapala [35,1979,p.85] has observed that since 1978 the
~ri Lankan government's economic strategy has guided the
expansion of diplomatic relations with certain countries
including South Korea and Singapore.

And,

that "some

government spokesmen have expressed the need to imitate South
Korea's economic development model."
seen a~ove two things would seem clear.

Based on what we ha~e
First, it is highly·

unlikely that Sri Lanka will be able to imitate South Korea's
economic development.

Second, if exports are ever going to

serve as an engine of growth in Sri Lanka, it will not be due
to the traditional major exports.

V.

CONCLUSION

In this paper we have taken issue with the prior research done
on the relationship between export growth and economic
development for ·treating LDCs as though they were homogeneous
and/or concentrating on the specially predisposed.

In an

attempt to begin to fill this perceived void in the literature
we have presented a case study of Sri Lanka,

one of the

world's poorest countries which has had a long history of
being export sector oriented in its policies.

The conclusion

was reached that exports have not been an engine of growth for
Sri Lanka and they may have inhibited it.

This failure can be
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explained, at least in part, by the failure of the Sri Lankan
export sector to change in response to changes in world demand
for the traditional major exports.
The results of this study should be of much interest to
the economic planners of Sri Lanka.

In addition, the study

should serve as an important caveat to the policy planners of
all

those

LDCs

that do not appear to display all the

characteristics necessary for trade to serve as a source of
economic growth.

Hopefully, it will serve as a reminder of

the importance of examining their own unique case first,
before adopting the policy prescriptions of the existing
general studies and studies of specially predisposed
countries.

FOOTNOTES
1.

See for example Keesing [21,1967], Nurske [27,1970], Feder
[12,1983], and Krueger, [23, 1983].

2.

Some of these studies are Emery [11,1967], Kravis
[22,1970], ' Chenery [7 ,1971], Balassa [2,1971], Westphal
[36,1978], Early [10,1980-81], Tyler
[33,1981], and Van
de Klundert and Kolnaar [34,1982].

3.

Streeten [32,1982] br6adly criticizes the logic of the
theory and challenges the usually cited examples of its
success. Lewis [24,1980] observes that trade as an engine
of growth of developing economies began to slow down after
the mid-1970s.
Karunaratne [19,1986] notes that the
developed countries'attitudes towards protectionism has
been changing. And, Cline concludes the generalization of
the East Asian model of export-led development across all
developing couritries would result in untenable market
penetration into the industrial countries.

4.

Balassa [2,1978] suffers from both of these shortcomings
and the studies by Early [10, 1980-81], and Westphal
[36,1978] on Korea are good examples of the second fault.

5.

There are numerous books and articles available on the
socio-economic and political history of Sri Lanka,
particularly on the colonization period, for the
interested reader.
I have relied on Richards and
Stoutjecdijk [31,1969] and Karunatilake [20,1971] for the
pre-1970 's period, and on Isenman [16,1980], [17,1981],
and Richards [30,1981] for information pertaining to the
1970's.

6.

The ratios were calculated by deflating the nominal export
values by the Central Bank of Ceylon's Export Prices Index
for the appropriate year ~nd then dividing by the nominal
value of GNP for that year deflated by the GNP Price
Deflatior (1967=100).
The data used here and throughout
the paper were obtained from various issues of the Central
Bank of Ceylon's Annual Report
of the Monetary Board to
the Minister of Finance, annual, 1950-, [4]
Bulletin,
monthly, 1950-, [5]; Review of the Economy, annual,
1975-, [6]; and Peebles [28, 1982].

7.

Tea and rubber are produced mainly for export, with moFe·
than 90 percent of total output being exported in a
typical year.
Only in the case of coconuts is there any
sizeable domestic consumption. Any significant abandoning
or uprooting of trees or bushes is unlikely in the short
run due to the high fixed costs of plantation crops and
the long lead times.
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TABLE I

Real
Exports
(f.o.b.)
Rs.M.

Year

Real
GNP
Rs.M.

Real X
-;-Real GNP
%

1957

1,402

5,718

24.52

1958

1,450

5,819

24.92

1959

1,438

5,935

24.23

1960

1,502

6,331

23.72

1961

1,547

6,468

23.92

1962

1,659

6,760

24.54

1963

1,588

6,950

22.85

1964

1,690

7,417

22.79

1965

1,725

7,606

22.68

1966

1,589

7,870

20.19

1967

1,690

8,265

20.45

1968

1,739

8,962

19.40

1969

1,638

9,367

17.49

1970

1,723

9,811

17.56

1971

1,664

9,834

16.92

19 72

1,703

10,160

16.76

1973

1,910

10,541

18.12

1974

1,630

10,947

14.89

1975

1,976

11,247

17.57

1976

2,015

11,586

17.39

1977

1,738

12,100

14.36

1978

1,892

13,094

14.45

Source:

see note 6

